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美國國家經濟與安全審查委員會向國會提的26條建議：5G、臺灣、朝鮮……

點擊：  作者：博士陳    來源：修昔底德的回聲  發布時間:2018-12-11 10:22:10

 

        寫完白宮幕僚專欄及其各自所把持的部門之后，筆者最近比較關注美中經濟與安全審查委員會（USCC），發現它就像是美國處理與中國關系的一個中央處理器。它們每年都會出一個年報，從2002年至今，一年比一年厚，能感受到話語體系的變化。在2007年的報告中，筆者發現它就引用了納瓦羅的研究成果，指出中國不公平競爭的5大武器，包括貨幣貶值、盜竊知識產權、環保條例比較寬松、出口補貼等，也指出了中國沒有遵守WTO規則。它們每年都會給國會提幾十條建議，建議其給各個部門分配任務，調查相關問題。從現在的美國政策來看，多少都有體現。

本文是2018年年報，發表于2018年11月14日，分4章，共11個部分，全面評估了中美經濟、貿易、國家安全、軍事等方面的關系，還評估了中國與美國盟友、中國與亞太國家（如朝鮮等）、中國與臺灣地區、中國與香港地區的關系，同時還有對中國國內推行的“一帶一路”等計劃的評估。在此基礎上，它像國會提出了26條建議，建議國會指示或授權各部門之間加強協調，或開展某些新的評估項目，這些都是下一步工作的重點。

讀2018年的報告，再配合中興、晉華、華為等事件，心中非常不安，一方面用詞非常“狠”，另一方面對技術，特別是5G、通信和物聯網技術，要全面壓制中國。所以，制裁可能仍在路上。

考慮到很少有讀者能夠耐心的讀完這539頁的英文報告，筆者將最核心的“建議”部分翻譯總結如下，共各位讀者參考（報告有個總結部分，可以去官網下載，地址：https://www.uscc.gov/Annual_Reports/2018-annual-report）。

Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations

美中經濟與貿易關系

Section 2: Tools to Address U.S.-China Economic Challenges

處理美中經濟挑戰的工具

The Commission recommends:

委員會建議

1. Congress examine whether the Office ofthe U.S. Trade Representative should bring, in coordination with U.S. alliesand partners, a “non-violation nullification or impairment” case—alongside violationsof specific commitments—against China at the World Trade Organization underArticle 23(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

美國國會評估美國貿易代表辦公室是否應與美國的盟友和伙伴協調，根據世界貿易組織《關稅及貿易總協定》第23(b)條，對中國采取“不違反規定的撤銷或損害”措施，并考察其是否違反某項具體承諾。

2. Congress direct the Office of the U.S.Trade Representative to identify the trade-distorting practices of Chinese state-owned enterprises and develop policies to counteract theiranticompetitive impact.

美國國會指示美國貿易代表辦公室查明中國國有企業扭曲貿易的行為，并制定政策抵消這些行為的反競爭影響。（編者注：典型的就是“301”調查報告）

3. Congress direct the Government Accountability Office to conduct an assessment of U.S.-China collaborative initiatives in technical cooperation. This assessment should describe thenature of collaboration, including funding, participation, and reporting on theoutcomes; detail the licensing and regulatory regime under which theinitiatives occur; consider whether the intellectual property rights of U.S.researchers and companies are being adequately protected; examine whether Chinese state-owned enterprises or the military are benefitting from U.S.taxpayer-funded research; investigate if any Chinese researchers participating inthe collaboration have ties to the Chinese government or military; investigateif any U.S. companies, universities, or labs participating in U.S. government-led collaboration with China have been subject to cyber penetration originating in China; and evaluate the benefits of this collaboration for theUnited States. Further, this assessment should examine redundancies, if any,among various U.S.-China government-led collaborative programs, and make suggestions for improving collaboration.

國會指示政府問責局（Government Accountability Office）對中美技術合作的合作倡議進行評估。該評估應描述合作的性質，包括資助、參與者以及結果；詳述有關措施所依據的許可及規管制度；考慮美國研究人員和公司的知識產權是否得到充分保護；研究中國國有企業或軍隊是否從美國納稅人資助的研究中受益；調查參與合作的中國研究人員是否與中國政府或軍方有聯系；調查參與美國政府主導的美中合作項目的任何美國公司、大學或實驗室是否受到源自中國的網絡滲透；并評估這種合作對美國的好處。此外，這一評估還應調查由政府主導的美中合作項目是否存在浪費現象（冗余），如果有的話，并提出改進合作的建議。

Section 3: China’s Agricultural Policies: Trade, Investment, Safety, and Innovation.

中國的農業政策:貿易、投資、安全和創新

The Commission recommends:

委員會建議:

4. Congress direct the U.S. Department ofAgriculture to identify the extent to which China’s asynchronous biotech reviewand approval system for agricultural products adversely impacts U.S. industry.As part of its review, the U.S. Department of Agriculture should work with theOffice of the U.S. Trade Representative to seek bilateral or multilateralmeasures, as appropriate, to address these impacts.

美國國會指示美國農業部查明中國對農產品的非同步生物技術審查和批準制度對美國工業的不利影響程度。作為審查的一部分，美國農業部應與美國貿易代表辦公室合作，尋求適當的雙邊或多邊措施，以解決這些影響。

5. Congress direct the U.S. Department ofAgriculture, in collaboration with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, toprepare an annual report on its technical engagement with China on food safety, inspection, mechanisms foraddressing sanitary and phytosanitary problems, and any technical assistanceprovided to China to improve its food safety inspection regime.

國會指示美國農業部與美國食品和藥物管理局合作，就其與中國在食品安全、檢驗、衛生和植物衛生問題處理機制方面的技術接觸，以及為改進其食品安全檢驗制度而向中國提供的任何技術援助，編制一份年度報告。

Chapter 2: U.S.-China Security Relations

美中安全關系

Section 2: China’s Military Reorganization and Modernization: Implications for the United States.

中國的軍事改組和現代化：對美國的啟示

The Commission recommends:

委員會建議:

6. Congress direct the U.S. Department ofDefense and U.S. Department of Homeland Security to provide to the relevant committeesof jurisdiction a report, with a classified annex, assessing how the change in the China Coast Guard’scommand structure affects its status as a law enforcement entity now that itreports to the Central Military Commission. The report should discuss theimplications of this new structure for China’s use of the coast guard as acoercive tool in “gray zone” activity in the East and South China seas. Thisreport should also determine how this change may affect U.S. Navy andU.S. Coast Guard interactions with the China Coast Guard, and whether thelatter should be designated as a military force.

國會指示美國國防部和美國國土安全部，向有關權力部門提供報告（附保密附件），評估中國海警指揮機構的變動——直接向中央軍事委員會報告——對其執法地位的影響。報告應討論這種變化對中國在東海和南海“灰色地帶”活動中使用海上保安廳作為強制性工具的影響。本報告還應確定這一變化可能如何影響美國海軍和美國海岸警衛隊與中國海岸警衛隊的互動，以及中國海岸警衛隊是否應被指定為一支軍事力量。

7. Congress consider imposing sanctions onkey Chinese state-owned enterprises and individuals involved in China’s ongoingmilitarization of the South China Sea.

美國國會考慮對參與中國南海軍事化進程的關鍵國有企業和個人實施制裁。

Chapter 3: China and the World

中國與世界

Section 1: Belt and Road Initiative

“一帶一路”倡議

The Commission recommends:

委員會建議：

8. Congress create a fund to provide additional bilateral assistance for countries that are a target of orvulnerable to Chinese economic or diplomatic pressure, especially in theIndo-Pacific region. The fund should be used to promote digital connectivity, infrastructure,and energy access. The fund could also be used to promote sustainabledevelopment, combat corruption, promote transparency, improve rule of law,respond to humanitarian crises, and build the capacity of civil society and themedia.

美國國會設立了一個基金，為那些受到中國經濟或外交壓力的，或容易受到中國經濟或外交壓力影響的國家，特別是在印太地區，提供額外的雙邊援助。該基金應用于促進數字連接、基礎設施和能源獲取。該基金還可用于促進可持續發展、打擊腐敗、提高透明度、改善法治、應對人道主義危機以及建設公民社會和媒體的能力。

9. Congress require the U.S. Department ofState to prepare a report to Congress on the actions it is taking to provide analternative, fact-based narrative to counter Chinese messaging on the Belt andRoad Initiative (BRI). Such a report should also examine where BRI projectsfail to meet international standards and highlight the links between BRI andChina’s attempts to suppress information about and misrepresent reporting ofits human rights abuses of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.

美國國會要求美國國務院就其正在采取的行動向國會提交一份報告，提供另一種基于事實的敘述，以對抗中國在“一帶一路”倡議中傳遞的信息。此類報告還應審查“一帶一路”項目在哪些方面不符合國際標準，并突出“一帶一路”與中國試圖掩蓋新疆維吾爾族人權侵犯信息和歪曲報道之間的聯系。

10. Congress require the Director of National Intelligence to produce a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), with aclassified annex, that details the impact of basing facilities along the Beltand Road on freedom of navigation and sea control, both in peacetime and duringa conflict. The NIE should cover the impact on U.S., allied, and regionalpolitical and security interests.

美國國會要求國家情報機關出具一份國家情報評估報告(NationalIntelligence Estimate, NIE)，并附上一份機密附件，詳細說明在和平時期和沖突時期，中國將“一帶一路”沿線的設施建立在航行自由和海上控制基礎上的影響。國家情報評估報告應該涵蓋對美國、美國的盟國和地區的政治與安全利益。

 

Section 2: China’s Relations with U.S.Allies and Partners

中國與美國盟友與伙伴的關系

The Commission recommends:

委員會建議：

11. Congress direct the Administration tostrengthen cooperation between the United States and its allies and partners inEurope and the Indo-Pacific on shared economic and security interests andpolicies pertaining to China, including through the following measures:

國會指示政府加強美國及其在歐洲和印度-太平洋地區的盟友和伙伴在與中國有關的共同經濟和安全利益及政策方面的合作，包括通過以下措施:

• Urge the Administration to engage inregular information sharing and joint monitoring of Chinese investment activities and to share best practices regarding screening of foreign investments with national security implications, including development ofcommon standards for screening mechanisms.

敦促政府對中國投資活動進行定期信息共享和聯合監測，并就涉及國家安全的外國投資篩選工作分享最佳做法，包括制定篩選機制的共同標準。

• Enhance consultations on mitigating theexport of dual-use technology to China and identifying other foundational technologies essential for national security.

加強在減少向中國出口軍民兩用技術和確定對國家安全至關重要的其他基礎技術方面的磋商。

12. Congress direct the U.S. Department ofJustice to:

國會指示美國司法部

• Examine the application of current U.S.laws, including the “Conspiracy against Rights” law, toprosecuting Chinese Communist Party affiliates who threaten, coerce, orotherwise intimidate U.S. residents.

審查現行美國法律的適用情況，包括反陰謀法，以起訴威脅、脅迫或以其他方式恐嚇美國居民的中國共產黨附屬機構。

• Clarify that labels required by theForeign Agents Registration Act on informational materials disseminated onbehalf of foreign principals, such as China Daily, must appear prominently atthe top of the first page of such materials.

明確《外國代理登記法》對代表外國委托人（如《中國日報》）傳播的信息材料的標簽，必須出現在這種材料首頁上的顯著位置。

13. Congress direct the National Counterintelligence and Security Center to produce an unclassified annualreport, with a classified annex, on the Chinese Communist Party’s influence andpropaganda activities in the United States.

美國國會指示美國國家反間諜和安全中心編制一份非機密年度報告，其中包含一份機密附件，內容涉及CCP在美國的影響力和宣傳活動。

14. Congress direct the Administration todiscuss in its engagements with the EU and NATO the implications of China’s increasingly close military ties with Russia and growing importance to transatlantic security interests. Such discussions would include how Europe and NATO canpromote the exchange of information on common defense and other challenges posed by China and Russia.

美國國會指示政府在與歐盟(EU)和北約(NATO)打交道時，討論中國與俄羅斯日益密切的軍事關系以及對跨大西洋安全利益日益重要的影響，這些討論將包括歐洲和北約如何促進就共同防御以及中國和俄羅斯提出的其他挑戰交換信息。

Section 3: China and Taiwan

中國與臺灣

The Commission recommends:

委員會建議：

15. Congress direct the Office of the U.S.Trade Representative to resume meetings under the U.S.-Taiwan Trade andInvestment Framework Agreement in 2019 and to identify enhanced negotiating proceduresto resolve outstanding issues.

國會指示美國貿易代表辦公室在美國國會授權下，重新開始2019年的《美臺貿易投資框架協議》會議，并確定更高級的談判程序，以解決懸而未決的問題。

16. Congress direct the Administration toproduce an interagency report on a whole-of-government strategy for supportingTaiwan’s engagement with the international community, including considerationof, but not limited to, the following actions:

美國國會指示政府就支持臺灣參與國際社會的整體策略編制一份跨部門報告，包括考慮但不限于下列行動:

• Explore opportunities for providing proactive development and security assistance to Taiwan’s diplomatic partnersin an effort to encourage them to maintain ties with Taipei.

探索向臺灣的外交伙伴提供積極發展和安全援助的機會，以鼓勵他們與臺北保持聯系。

•• Identify adjustments the United Statescould take in its relations with Taiwan in response to Beijing altering thecross- Strait status quo and taking coercive action to pressure Taipei.

找出美國可以與臺灣關系做出的調整，以回應北京改變兩岸現狀并采取脅迫行動以向臺灣施壓。

• Discuss cross-Strait relations and U.S.policy regarding Taiwan in meetings with U.S. allied and partner governments andsupport an expansion of commercial, cultural, and other exchanges between Taiwan and those countries.

在與美國的盟國和伙伴政府的會議上討論兩岸關系和美國對臺政策，支持擴大臺灣與這些國家間的商業、文化和其他交流。

• Establish a high-level bilateralU.S.-Taiwan development dialogue to encourage Taiwan’s role in promoting sustainable global development.

建立高級別雙邊關系，支持臺灣在促進全球可持續發展方面發揮作用。

17. Congress consider amending antiboycott laws under the Export Administration Act or pass new legislation to prohibitU.S. companies from complying with China’s efforts to apply pressure on Taiwan.Such legislation could include measures authorizing reciprocal sanctions on Chinese entities in the event of Chinese government retaliation against U.S.companies.

美國國會考慮根據《出口管理法》，修改反抵制法，或通過新的立法，禁止美國公司服從中國對臺灣施加壓力的努力。這類立法可能包括授權在中國政府報復美國公司的情況下對中國實體實施對等制裁的措施。

18. Congress direct the U.S. Department ofDefense to support the implementation of Taiwan’s new Overall Defense Conceptand take actions that support Taiwan’s ability to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability by including Taiwan military personnel as participants or observersin U.S. and U.S.-led multilateral military exercises; conducting regular high-level exchanges of military planning and other advisory personnel pursuantto the Taiwan Travel Act; and considering the potential for assisting Taiwanwith the creative acquisition of critical defense articles, including through coproduction of defense technology between U.S. and Taiwan companies.

美國國會指示美國國防部支持實施臺灣新的整體防御理念，并采取行動支持臺灣保持足夠的自衛能力，將臺灣軍事人員作為參與者或觀察員，包括在美國和美國領導的多邊軍事演習中;根據《臺灣旅游法》，定期進行軍事規劃和其他咨詢人員的高層交往；并考慮協助臺灣創造性地獲取關鍵防務用品的可能性，包括通過美國和臺灣公司之間的防務技術合作。

19. Congress consider raising the threshold of congressional notification on sales of defense articles and services toTaiwan to those set for major U.S. allies, and terminating any requirement toprovide notification of maintenance and sustainment of Taiwan’s existingcapabilities.

美國國會考慮提高向美國主要盟國對臺出售防務用品和服務的通報門檻，并終止對臺灣現有軍事設備進行維修或維護進行通報的任何要求。

20. Congress express support for the TsaiAdministration’s approach to maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

美國國會對蔡英文政府維持臺灣海峽現狀的做法表示支持。

 

Section 5: China’s Evolving North KoreaStrategy

中國對朝鮮戰略的演變

24. Congress direct the U.S. Department of the Treasury to provide a report within 180 days on the current state ofChinese enforcement of sanctions on North Korea. A classified annex shouldprovide a list of Chinese financial institutions, businesses, and officials involved in trading with North Korea that could be subject to future sanctions,and should explain the potential broader impacts of sanctioning those entities.

美國國會指示美國財政部在180天內就中國對朝鮮實施制裁的現狀提交一份報告，并附一份機密附件，列出與朝鮮進行貿易的中國金融機構、企業和官員名單，這些機構、企業和官員未來可能會受到制裁，并應解釋制裁這些實體可能產生的更廣泛影響。

Chapter 4: China’s High-Tech Development

中國的高科技發展

The Commission recommends:

委員會建議：

25. Congress require the Office of Management and Budget’s Federal Chief Information Security Officer Council toprepare an annual report to Congress to ensure supply chain vulnerabilities from China are adequately addressed. This report should collect and assess:

國會要求管理和預算辦公室的聯邦首席信息安全委員會向國會提交一份年度報告，以確保來自中國的供應鏈漏洞得到充分解決。本報告應收集和評估:

• Each agency’s plans for supply chainrisk management and assessments;

每個機構的供應鏈風險管理和評估計劃;

• Existing departmental procurement andsecurity policies and guidance on cybersecurity, operations security, physicalsecurity, information security and data security that may affect informationand communications technology, 5G networks, and Internet of Things devices; and

現有的可能影響信息通信技術、5G網絡和物聯網設備的網絡安全、運營安全、物理安全、信息安全和數據安全方面的部門采購、安全政策和指導方針；和

• Areas where new policies and guidancemay be needed—including for specific information and communications technology, 5G networks, and Internet of Things devices, applications, or procedures—andwhere existing security policies and guidance can be updated to address supply chain, cyber, operations, physical, information, and data securityvulnerabilities.

指出哪些領域需要新的政策和指導方案——包括特定的信息和通信技術、5G網絡、物聯網設備、應用程序或流程——以及哪些領域現有的安全政策和指導方案可以更新，以解決供應鏈、網絡、運營、物理、信息和數據安全漏洞。

26. Congress direct the National Telecommunications and Information Administration and Federal Communications Commission to identify (1) steps to ensure the rapid and secure deployment of a5G network, with a particular focus on the threat posed by equipment andservices designed or manufactured in China; and (2) whether any new statutoryauthorities are required to ensure the security of domestic 5G networks.

美國國會指示美國國家電信和信息管理局和聯邦通信委員會確定：（1）確保5G網絡的快速和安全部署的步驟，特別關注在中國設計或制造的設備和服務帶來的威脅；（2）是否需要新的法定機構來保障國內5G網絡的安全。