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 武裝通信與電子協(xié)會（AFCEA）指揮官TechNet印度-太平洋會議（記錄致辭）

ADM菲爾·戴維森（Phil Davidson） | 美國印度太平洋司令部公共事務(wù)辦公室| 2021年3月1日

ADM Phil Davidson
美國印度洋-太平洋司令部
夏威夷，檀香山，
2021年3月1日，已 
準(zhǔn)備交付 

大家好！我希望此消息能使您身體健康。參加第一個虛擬TechNet確實是一種榮幸。

我要感謝Dick Macke海軍上將，AFCEA International和AFCEA Hawaii使這次活動成為可能。

盡管COVID提出了挑戰(zhàn)，但您為召開這次會議所做的努力表明了應(yīng)對印度太平洋動態(tài)安全挑戰(zhàn)所需的適應(yīng)性，創(chuàng)新性和毅力。

我很高興有機(jī)會在指揮期間第三次與該小組講話。

在我的首次露面時，我向您介紹了“自由和開放的印度太平洋”構(gòu)想，以及它如何推動我們的聯(lián)合部隊努力并塑造了我們在該地區(qū)的做法。

然后在2019年，我討論了中國對自由開放的印度太平洋的構(gòu)想的戰(zhàn)略威脅，特別側(cè)重于信息領(lǐng)域。

今天，我想分享我在接下來的幾周內(nèi)向國防部和國會傳達(dá)的信息的預(yù)覽。

我的目的是提供一個總體背景，為您在本次會議期間的討論提供參考。

希望它將在接下來的幾天之內(nèi)進(jìn)一步激發(fā)您的專業(yè)領(lǐng)域內(nèi)的對話，辯論和深入思考。
現(xiàn)在，作為我作為戰(zhàn)斗指揮官的職責(zé)的一部分，我必須按照《國防授權(quán)法》（NDAA）的指示，向國會提交兩份正式文件。

兩者是完全獨立但互補(bǔ)的，并且為了便于討論，它們講述了印度太平洋的故事。

第一個是我的年度態(tài)勢聲明，該聲明提供了印度太平洋劇院安全環(huán)境的總體狀況–它加強(qiáng)了我在國會面前的年度證詞聽證會。

第二個是獨立評估，概述了印度國防軍司令部最緊迫的作戰(zhàn)要求，以告知太平洋威懾倡議（PDI）。

這項倡議是國會在21年財政年度制定的，其目的是解決由于我們從大國競爭中面臨的威脅而導(dǎo)致的聯(lián)合需求缺口。

從根本上說，態(tài)勢陳述和獨立評估都是圍繞一個基本事實構(gòu)建的：

我們在印度太平洋地區(qū)面臨的最大危險是對中國的傳統(tǒng)威懾力量的削弱。

如果沒有有效和令人信服的常規(guī)威懾力量，中國將大膽采取行動，取代已建立的以規(guī)則為基礎(chǔ)的國際秩序。

我們在印度太平洋地區(qū)的聯(lián)合部隊必須擺出姿勢，以提供可靠的戰(zhàn)斗威懾力量，以保護(hù)通過空中，海上，陸地，太空和網(wǎng)絡(luò)空間自由和開放地進(jìn)入貿(mào)易路線。

為了有效地威懾，我們需要為聯(lián)合部隊配備適當(dāng)?shù)哪芰Γ芰Γ瑱?quán)力和原則，以支持快速的部隊使用，準(zhǔn)確的進(jìn)攻力量和有效的防御。

我們必須證明并傳達(dá)我們的意愿，以及我們對眼前政治目標(biāo)的承諾。

我們必須說服北京，以軍事力量實現(xiàn)其目標(biāo)的代價實在是太高了。

印度國防軍正在采取向前部署的縱深威懾態(tài)勢，以捍衛(wèi)祖國，并在全球范圍內(nèi)保護(hù)我們的價值觀和利益。

通過這樣做，我們將通過展示能力，能力和意志來否認(rèn)中國的目標(biāo)，并在必要時對中國軍隊施加成本，從而實現(xiàn)有利的安全環(huán)境。

從本質(zhì)上講，我們的部隊必須具有機(jī)動性（如果愿意的話，則要敏捷），并且必須具有深厚的多領(lǐng)域火力才能獲得陣地優(yōu)勢；我們必須利用一系列可互操作且兼容的盟友和伙伴，并且我們必須定期表現(xiàn)出拒絕和擊敗的“威懾力”。

為了實現(xiàn)所有這些目標(biāo)，有四個主要重點領(lǐng)域可以指導(dǎo)INDOPACOM在該地區(qū)提供可靠的常規(guī)威懾力量的方法。

首先，我們必須增加我們的聯(lián)合殺傷力。

基本設(shè)計是一個整合的聯(lián)合部隊，它可以否定敵方在海洋，空中，陸地，太空和網(wǎng)絡(luò)領(lǐng)域中的統(tǒng)治能力，進(jìn)而支持我們自己在各個領(lǐng)域進(jìn)行控制和投射的能力，有時是周期性的，有時是堅持不懈。

我們的聯(lián)合部隊必須更充分地整合其網(wǎng)絡(luò)能力，太空部隊，特種作戰(zhàn)部隊以及裝備有空中火力和海上部隊遠(yuǎn)程火力的地面部隊，以展現(xiàn)“致命性”，這是使對手處于危險之中的有效威懾力量。

而且，僅靠防御還不夠-用導(dǎo)彈抓彈是我們最難的事情-如果威懾力失敗，我們還必須保持強(qiáng)有力的進(jìn)攻和勝利。

我們的投資和現(xiàn)代化工作必須利用領(lǐng)先技術(shù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)所提供的先進(jìn)功能，例如：

集成的防空和導(dǎo)彈防御系統(tǒng)，采用分布在該地區(qū)的多個傳感器和攔截器來保護(hù)–不僅包括美國在內(nèi)的國土，而且我們的美軍也前進(jìn)。

這些防御措施還必須利用，整合和保護(hù)我們的關(guān)鍵盟友和合作伙伴。

在關(guān)島等固定地點建立的功能強(qiáng)大，適應(yīng)能力強(qiáng)且經(jīng)過驗證的系統(tǒng)（如AEGIS）將從第二島鏈提供持續(xù)的360度綜合空導(dǎo)彈防御。

我們擁有數(shù)十億美元的軍事能力和基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，眾多的指揮與控制節(jié)點，維修，后勤和維持設(shè)施，以及成千上萬的美國公民在關(guān)島進(jìn)行保護(hù)和保衛(wèi)。

在夏威夷，國土防御雷達(dá)-夏威夷（HDR-H）代表了我們檢測，跟蹤，辨別和擊敗彈道，巡航和高超音速導(dǎo)彈威脅的能力缺口的解決方案。

遠(yuǎn)程精確打擊可讓“緊縮”距離和環(huán)外距離的各種目標(biāo)集處于危險之中。

這些先進(jìn)的武器系統(tǒng)意義重大，絕對需要集成的跨部門和跨系統(tǒng)設(shè)計，以釋放聯(lián)合部隊的全部潛力。

戰(zhàn)斧，SM-6，LRASM，HIMARS和遠(yuǎn)程超音速飛機(jī)的部署只是這些遠(yuǎn)程火力的幾個例子，這需要我們的對手考慮在防御系統(tǒng)上進(jìn)行進(jìn)一步的投資。

聯(lián)合指揮與控制（C2）網(wǎng)絡(luò)在決策過程中提供了速度和靈活性，從而可以滲透并分解對手的系統(tǒng)，從而挫敗了他們的進(jìn)攻能力。

戰(zhàn)術(shù)多用途地平線以上雷達(dá)（TACMOR）將為國際日期變更線以西的空中和地面目標(biāo)提供持久，遠(yuǎn)程，探測和跟蹤的能力。

此功能將通過對該區(qū)域的空中和地面目標(biāo)進(jìn)行大范圍的檢測和跟蹤來顯著提高我們的態(tài)勢意識，并提供預(yù)警以防止突發(fā)襲擊。

此外，具有快速重訪率的天基持久雷達(dá)群可提供維持對PLA活動的態(tài)勢感知的增強(qiáng)能力。

人工智能，量子計算，遙感，機(jī)器學(xué)習(xí)，大數(shù)據(jù)分析和5G技術(shù)的結(jié)合將提供必要的感知，C2和深火能力，以支持我們在任何競爭舞臺上的機(jī)動力量。

的確，這些能力是在危機(jī)中威懾日常的關(guān)鍵推動力，并且是我們戰(zhàn)斗和獲勝能力的關(guān)鍵。

第二，我們必須增強(qiáng)力量設(shè)計和姿勢。

過去50年對該地區(qū)的歷史考察突顯了我們在1970年代從越南，泰國和臺灣撤出并在1990年代從菲律賓撤出之后，美國部隊的態(tài)勢發(fā)生了變化。

現(xiàn)在，我們正在從對東北亞和關(guān)島的以服務(wù)為中心的歷史性重心向適應(yīng)更加統(tǒng)一和分散的聯(lián)合部隊藍(lán)圖轉(zhuǎn)變。

這包括修改我們與盟國和合作伙伴的印太部隊編隊，以應(yīng)對中國的快速現(xiàn)代化。

我們在該地區(qū)的部隊設(shè)計和姿勢必須能夠使多個領(lǐng)域的能力融合，并在沒有集中的情況下創(chuàng)造質(zhì)量優(yōu)勢。

這是通過在戰(zhàn)區(qū)的廣度和深度上分布向前部署的聯(lián)合力量，同時平衡殺傷力和生存能力來實現(xiàn)的。

通過前向和輪流聯(lián)合部隊持久存在是證明我們對北京的承諾和決心同時確保盟友和伙伴的最可靠方式。

這種向前的存在使聯(lián)合部隊能夠維持這些部隊在更長的時間內(nèi)支持作戰(zhàn)行動。

它需要具有維持力和力量保護(hù)作用的威懾態(tài)勢，以使其具有韌性，生存力和可支撐性。
第三個重點領(lǐng)域是加強(qiáng)我們的盟友和伙伴。

我們的盟友和合作伙伴群是自由和開放的國際秩序的基礎(chǔ)，它提供了強(qiáng)大的力量來抵制惡性活動和侵略。

我們正在尋找一切機(jī)會，以增加與盟友和合作伙伴的聯(lián)合行動，演習(xí)和培訓(xùn)的頻率和強(qiáng)度。

即使面對COVID大流行，我們也正在提高整個地區(qū)的互操作性和兼容性，以增強(qiáng)我們的能力并改善我們的競爭協(xié)調(diào)能力。

這體現(xiàn)在信息共享協(xié)議，外國軍售，擴(kuò)大的軍事合作以及諸如TechNet之類的國際安全對話中，旨在解決我們與最親密的盟友和合作伙伴之間的共同安全問題。

任務(wù)合作伙伴環(huán)境（MPE）是一項關(guān)鍵投資，可提供彈性和冗余的聯(lián)合以及組合的命令和控制，以在所有領(lǐng)域進(jìn)行競爭。

從戰(zhàn)略層面到戰(zhàn)術(shù)層面，MPE將通過訪問跨所有領(lǐng)域發(fā)揮作用的多域傳感器網(wǎng)絡(luò)，提供劇院范圍內(nèi)的戰(zhàn)斗管理和自動化決策。

該環(huán)境使用基于云的技術(shù)，集成系統(tǒng)和安全的訪問控制來向我們的盟友和合作伙伴提供有保證的C4ISR。

為了配合這些信息共享功能，我們必須擁有一個強(qiáng)大的命令和控制網(wǎng)絡(luò)以實現(xiàn)可互操作的執(zhí)行。
我們正在開發(fā)一種集成架構(gòu)，以通過使用南亞，東南亞和大洋洲的信息融合中心，在志趣相投的國家之間橫向擴(kuò)展數(shù)據(jù)共享。

這些融合中心將結(jié)合并分析飛機(jī)，輪船和天基系統(tǒng)的傳感器數(shù)據(jù)，在美國，我們的盟友和我們的合作伙伴之間建立共同的海上圖景，以改善對潛在的非法捕魚，販運活動和跨國公司的集體監(jiān)視威脅。

第四個也是最后一個重點領(lǐng)域是演習(xí)，實驗和創(chuàng)新-不僅在聯(lián)合部隊內(nèi)部，而且還包括我們的其他盟友和合作伙伴。

應(yīng)對安全挑戰(zhàn)并展示我們在當(dāng)今動態(tài)運行環(huán)境中的決心的最有效方法是通過聯(lián)合試驗和高保真，多領(lǐng)域培訓(xùn)的持續(xù)運動。

為了實現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)，我們正在尋求在該地區(qū)關(guān)鍵地區(qū)建立一個實時，虛擬和建設(shè)性范圍的聯(lián)合網(wǎng)絡(luò)。

不幸的是，我們當(dāng)前的范圍，測試和/或培訓(xùn)設(shè)施是由每個部門（有時是由其服務(wù)測試和開發(fā)社區(qū)）分別構(gòu)建的，而很少考慮聯(lián)合部隊。此外，他們沒有獲得資金來開展聯(lián)合培訓(xùn)。

聯(lián)合部隊必須有能力通過可訪問的，大規(guī)模的，全域的和綜合的范圍，大規(guī)模地提高能力，以支持關(guān)鍵的聯(lián)合訓(xùn)練和聯(lián)合訓(xùn)練。

INDOPACOM是眾多服務(wù)和國家培訓(xùn)，測試以及操作范圍和相關(guān)設(shè)施的所在地，并且緊鄰該地區(qū)。

一些基于CONUS的聯(lián)合示例包括：

V范登堡空軍基地的西部靶場，
海軍空戰(zhàn)中心，點穆古和加利福尼亞州中國湖的武器部測試場，
N內(nèi)利斯空軍的內(nèi)華達(dá)州測試和培訓(xùn)中心基地，
歐文堡的國家培訓(xùn)中心和ev內(nèi)華達(dá)州的法倫靶場訓(xùn)練場。

該地區(qū)還有一些OCONUS設(shè)施：

聯(lián)合太平洋阿拉斯加山脈綜合體（JPARC），
at位于考艾島Barking Sands的太平洋導(dǎo)彈靶場設(shè)施（PMRF）和大島上的Pohakuloa訓(xùn)練靶場（PTA），以及
on夸賈林環(huán)礁上的里根試驗場（RTS）。

將我們在該地區(qū)的美國戰(zhàn)場與日本和澳大利亞的盟軍戰(zhàn)場整合在一起，將使我們能夠在裝備齊全的現(xiàn)場虛擬建設(shè)性試驗場中提高聯(lián)合能力和聯(lián)合能力，而這是我們的盟國和合作伙伴目前所沒有的。

一支由美國和盟軍組成的綜合部隊，定期展示其在各個領(lǐng)域的作戰(zhàn)行動，對潛在的對手提出了新的挑戰(zhàn)和困境。

當(dāng)然，最好的方法是通過高端，多領(lǐng)域的聯(lián)合練習(xí)。

我們正在將我們的聯(lián)合演習(xí)計劃現(xiàn)代化，使其成為一系列在西太平洋隨時間和空間有意鏈接的聯(lián)合演習(xí)和聯(lián)合演習(xí)。

INDOPACOM聯(lián)合演習(xí)計劃將整合現(xiàn)有的靶場，訓(xùn)練區(qū)域和測試設(shè)施，以產(chǎn)生部隊的戰(zhàn)備能力，測試新興能力并滿足戰(zhàn)區(qū)需求。

的確，先進(jìn)的“聯(lián)合演習(xí)計劃”與“聯(lián)合范圍網(wǎng)絡(luò)”相結(jié)合，使我們能夠揭示我們希望對手看到的某些能力，并隱藏我們不希望他們看到的事物。

這是任何威懾策略的主要組成部分。

最終狀態(tài)是一個綜合聯(lián)盟，可以有效地展示所有領(lǐng)域的行動，確保我們的國際準(zhǔn)則得到保護(hù)，并阻止?jié)撛趯κ植扇≤娛滦袆印?span lang="EN-US">

美國必須與我們的盟國和合作伙伴一道，實施一項不斷發(fā)展的常規(guī)威懾戰(zhàn)略，以證明其能力，能力和贏得競爭的意愿。

我在INDOPACOM的團(tuán)隊做了出色的工作，為該地區(qū)設(shè)計了一個框架，以推動在競爭，危機(jī)和沖突中獲勝所需的戰(zhàn)略舉措和運營理念。

現(xiàn)在，我需要您的幫助來進(jìn)行此設(shè)計，并繼續(xù)在劇院中進(jìn)行改進(jìn)。

這是通過促進(jìn)創(chuàng)新，批判性思考，發(fā)展專業(yè)知識，具有挑戰(zhàn)性的假設(shè)以及共同努力實現(xiàn)聯(lián)合部隊的全部潛力來實現(xiàn)的。

我們所有人都在推動聯(lián)合部隊?wèi)?yīng)對印度太平洋地區(qū)未來的安全挑戰(zhàn)和機(jī)遇方面發(fā)揮了作用。

我感謝您今天的時間，以及您希望改善印度太平洋（實際上是地球上最關(guān)鍵的地區(qū)）的繁榮與安全的愿望。

全文英文原文：

AFCEA TechNet Indo-Pacific Conference

By ADM Phil Davidson | U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Public Affairs Office | March 1, 2021

ADM Phil Davidson
Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
Armed Forces Communications & Electronics Association (AFCEA) TechNet Indo-Pacific Conference (Recorded Remarks)
HONOLULU, Hawaii
1 March 2021 
As Prepared for Delivery 

Aloha everyone! I hope this message finds you well and in good health. It is truly a pleasure to participate in the first virtual TechNet.

I would like to thank Admiral Dick Macke, AFCEA International, and AFCEA Hawaii for making this event possible.

Your efforts to host this conference despite the challenges presented by COVID demonstrates the type of adaptability, innovation, and perseverance needed to address the dynamic security challenges in the Indo-Pacific.

I am grateful for the opportunity to address this group for the third time while in command.

In my first appearance, I spoke to you about the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision and how it drives our Joint Force efforts and shapes our approach in the region.

Then in 2019, I discussed China’s strategic threat to the idea of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific with special emphasis on the information domain.

Today, I would like to share a preview of the message I am delivering to the Department of Defense and Congress over the next few weeks.

My intent is to provide an overarching context that informs your discussions during this conference.

Hopefully it will also spark further dialogue, debate, and deep thought within your professional circles, well beyond the next few days.
Now, as part of my duties as a combatant commander, I am required to submit two official documents to Congress – as directed by the National Defense Authorization Act (the NDAA).

The two are entirely separate but complimentary and – for ease of discussion – they tell the story of the Indo-Pacific.

The first is my annual posture statement that provides the overall status of the security environment in the Indo-Pacific Theater – it reinforces my annual testimony hearing before Congress.

The second is an independent assessment outlining INDOPACOM’s most pressing warfighting requirements to inform the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (or PDI).

The initiative was established by Congress in Fiscal Year 21 specifically to address joint requirement shortfalls given the threats we face from Great Power Competition.

Foundationally, both the posture statement and independent assessment were constructed around one fundamental truth:

The greatest danger we face in the Indo-Pacific region is the erosion of conventional deterrence vis-à-vis China.

Without a valid and convincing conventional deterrent, China will be emboldened to take action to supplant the established rules-based international order.

Our Joint Forces in the Indo-Pacific must be postured to provide combat credible deterrence to protect free and open access to trade routes through the air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace.

To effectively deter, we need to arm the Joint Force with the proper capabilities, capacities, authorities, and indeed the doctrine to support rapid force employment, accurate offensive power, and effective defenses.

And we have to demonstrate – and communicate – our will – and our commitment to the political object at hand.

We must convince Beijing that the costs to achieve its objectives by military force are simply too high.

INDOPACOM is pursuing a forward deployed, deterrence-in-depth posture to defend the homeland and protect our values and interests globally.

In doing so, we will achieve an advantageous security environment by demonstrating the capability, capacity, and will to deny China’s objectives and – if necessary – to impose costs on their military forces.

At the heart of it, our forces must be maneuverable – agile if you will – and have the depth of multi-domain fires needed to achieve positional advantage; we must leverage an array of interoperable and compatible allies and partners, and we must regularly demonstrate the “deterability” to deny and defeat.

To accomplish all of this, there are four key focus areas that guide INDOPACOM’s approach to providing combat credible conventional deterrence in the region.

First, we must increase our joint force lethality.

The fundamental design is an integrated Joint Force that can deny an adversary’s ability to dominate the sea, air, land, space, and cyber domains – and in turn, support our own ability to control and project in all domains, sometimes periodically, and sometimes persistently.

Our Joint Force must more fully integrate its cyber capabilities, space forces, special operations forces, and ground forces equipped with long-range fires with air and maritime forces to present the “lethality” – the effective deterrent that holds an adversary at risk.

And it is not enough to play defense alone – catching missiles with missiles is the hardest thing we do – we must also maintain a strong offense to fight and win should deterrence fail.

Our investments and modernization efforts must harness the advanced capabilities provided by a network of leading-edge technologies, such as:

Integrated Air and Missile Defenses that employ multiple sensors and interceptors distributed across the region to protect – not only the Homeland including our U.S. territories, but also our U.S. forces forward.

These defenses must leverage, integrate, and protect our critical allies and partners as well.

A highly capable, fully adaptable, and proven system – like AEGIS – established in fixed locations like Guam, will deliver persistent 360-degree, integrated air missile defense from the Second Island Chain.

We have billions of dollars in military capability and infrastructure, numerous command and control nodes, repair and logistics and sustainment facilities, and thousands of U.S. citizens to protect and defend in Guam.

And here in Hawaii, the Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii (HDR-H) represents the solution for the gap in our ability to detect, track, discriminate, and defeat ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missile threats.

Long Range Precision Strike to hold at risk a variety of target sets from distances both “in the clinch” and from outside the ring.

These advanced weapons systems are significant and absolutely require an integrated, cross-Service and cross-system design to unleash the full potential of the Joint Force.

The deployment of Tomahawk, SM-6, LRASM, HIMARS, and Long Range Hypersonics are but a few examples of these long range fires that will require our adversaries to consider further investment in defense systems.

Joint Command and Control (C2) Networks provide speed and flexibility in decision-making, which allows penetration and then disintegration of an adversary’s systems, thereby defeating their offensive capabilities.

The Tactical Multi-Mission Over-the-Horizon Radar (TACMOR) will provide a persistent, long-range, detect and track capability of air and surface targets west of the International Date Line.

This capability will dramatically increase our situational awareness with wide-area, detection, and tracking of air and surface targets in the region and provide early warning to prevent surprise attacks.

Additionally, a constellation of Space-Based Persistent Radars with rapid revisit rates to provide the ability to maintain a heightened situational awareness of PLA activity.

The combination of artificial Intelligence, quantum computing, remote sensing, machine learning, big data analytics, and 5G technology will provide the necessary sensing, C2, and deep fires capabilities to support our maneuver forces in any contested arena.

Indeed, these capabilities are critical enablers to deter day-to-day, in crisis, and key to our ability to fight and win.

Second, we must enhance our force design and posture.

A historical look at the region over the past 50 years highlights the shift of our U.S. force posture as we moved out of Vietnam, Thailand, and Taiwan in the 1970s and then out of the Philippines in the 1990s.

Now, we are adapting from our historic Service-centric focus on Northeast Asia and Guam toward a more integrated and distributed Joint Force blueprint.

This includes revising our Indo-Pacific force laydown with our allies and partners to account for China’s rapid modernization.

Our force design and posture in the region must enable the convergence of capabilities from multiple domains and create the virtues of mass without concentration.

This is accomplished by distributing a forward-deployed, joint force across the battlespace's breadth and depth while balancing lethality and survivability.

Persistent presence thru forward-based and rotational joint forces is the most credible way to demonstrate our commitment and resolve to Beijing, while simultaneously assuring allies and partners.

This forward presence allows the Joint Force to sustain these forces to support combat operations over extend time periods.

It requires a deterrent posture that possesses the sustainment and force protection to be resilient, survivable, and supportable.
The third focus area is strengthening our allies and partners.

Our constellation of allies and partners is the backbone of the free and open international order, providing a powerful force to counter malign activity and aggression.

We are seeking every opportunity to increase the frequency and intensity of our combined operations, exercises, and training with our allies and partners.

Even in the face of the COVID pandemic, we are increasing our interoperability and compatibility across the region to enhance our capabilities and improve our coordination for competition.

This manifests itself in information sharing agreements, foreign military sales, expanded military cooperation, and international security dialogues – such as TechNet – designed to address our mutual security concerns alongside our closest allies and partners.

The Mission Partner Environment (MPE) is the critical investment that provides for resilient and redundant joint and combined command and control to compete across all domains.

From the strategic to tactical level, MPE will provide theater-wide battle management and automated decision-making by accessing a multi-domain sensor network that functions across all domains.

This environment uses cloud-based technologies, integrated systems, and secure access controls to provide assured C4ISR with our allies and partners.

To accompany these info-sharing functions, we must have a robust command and control network for interoperable execution.
We are developing an integrated architecture to horizontally expand data-sharing among like-minded nations through the use of information fusion centers in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania.

These fusion centers will combine and analyze sensor data from aircraft, ships, and space-based systems, building a common maritime picture between the U.S, our allies, and our partners to improve our collective surveillance of potential illegal fishing, trafficking activities, and transnational threats.

The fourth and final focus area is exercises, experimentation, and innovation – not only within the Joint Force – but with our other allies and partners as well.

The most effective way to combat the security challenges and demonstrate our resolve in today’s dynamic operating environment is through a continuous campaign of joint experimentation and high-fidelity, multi-domain training.

To accomplish this, we are pursuing the development of a joint network of live, virtual, and constructive ranges in key locations around the region.

Unfortunately, our current range, test, and/or training facilities are built separately by each Service – sometimes by their Service test and development community – and rarely with the Joint Force in mind. Further, they are not funded to enable joint training.

The Joint Force must have the ability to advance capability at scale – through accessible, large-scale, all-domain, and integrated ranges to support critical joint and combined training and exercises.

INDOPACOM is home to – and in close proximity to – numerous Service and national training, testing, and operational ranges and related facilities.

Some CONUS-based, joint examples include:

 The Western Range at Vandenberg Air Force Base,-
 The Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division test ranges in Point Mugu and China Lake, California,-
 The Nevada Test and Training Center at Nellis Air Force Base,-
 The The National Training Center at Fort Irwin, and-
 The Fallon Range Training Complex in Nevada.-

And there are also several OCONUS facilities in the region:

 The Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC),-
 The Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) at Barking Sands on Kauai and the Pohakuloa Training Range (PTA) on the Big Island, and-
 The Reagan Test Site (RTS) on the Kwajalein atoll.-

Integrating our U.S. ranges in the region with allied ranges in Japan and Australia will allow us to advance joint and combined capability and capacity in a fully instrumented live-virtual-constructive proving ground – something our allies and partners do not have currently.

An integrated U.S. and coalition force that regularly demonstrates operations across all domains presents new challenges and dilemmas to potential adversaries.

Certainly, the best way to accomplish this is through high-end, multi-domain, joint exercises.

We are modernizing our Joint Exercise Program into a series of joint and coalition exercises deliberately linked over time and space in the Western Pacific.

The INDOPACOM Joint Exercise Program will integrate existing ranges, training areas, and test facilities to generate force readiness, test emerging capabilities, and drive theater requirements.

Indeed, an advanced Joint Exercise Program – combined with a Joint Range Network – provides us the ability to reveal certain capabilities we want our adversaries to see and conceal the things we do not want them to see.

This is a major component of any strategy of deterrence.

The end state is an integrated coalition that can demonstrate operations effectively in all domains, assuring our international norms are protected and dissuading potential adversaries from military action.

The United States – alongside our allies and partners – must implement an evolving conventional deterrence strategy that demonstrates its capacity, its capability, and its will to win this competition.

My team at INDOPACOM has done an exceptional job designing a framework for the region to drive the strategic initiatives and operational concepts required to win in competition, crisis, and conflict.

Now, I need your help to take this design and continue to advance it in the theater.

This is done by fostering innovation, thinking critically, developing expertise, challenging assumptions, and working collectively to realize the full potential of our Joint Force.

We all play a part in advancing our Joint Force for the future security challenges and opportunities in the Indo-Pacific.

I thank you for your time today and for your desire to improve the prosperity and security of the Indo-Pacific – indeed, the most critical region on the planet.

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